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THE MEXICAN DOCTRINE OF IMPOSED
JOINT OWNERSHIP
MANUEL BORJA MARTINEZ
rim7e general rule of the Roman law that "No one may be forced to
remain in a community"' is wcll known. As well known as the general rule
are the exceptions thereto. One of the exceptions applicable here, is that
"A thing may remain undivided by destination." This exception is also
found in the Digest which quotes a text of Paulus, "Where the proceeding
is against the will of any of the owners, a maste should not be appointed
to partition a common thing as, for example, the vestibule of two houses,
because he may be forced in fixing the auction price of the vestibule to
take the entire value of the house if it does not have another entrance."
The modern French, Italian, and Portuguese writers agree that a com-
pulsory joint property exists along side of ordinary co-ownership. Cunha
Goncalves says that "no legal system favors joint ownership since it has
been proven beyond any doubt that individual ownership is the best form
for achieving the maximum utilization of a particular thing, and in addition
because long experience has demonstrated the accuracy of the Roman
saying 'Communio mater diseordiarum' (The community is the mother
of discord.)
' 4
It is agreed that in certain situations "the failure to divide interests
or the imposed continuation of a community of interests, rather than making
more difficult the proper exploitation of the thing held in common, is
indispensable for this very utilization. Disagreements which may arise
among the joint owners ought not to be feared, particularly because one is
dealing with things whose proper destination to joint use is clear to all
at first sight; and finally that the economic desirability which generally
favors the free circulation of all goods is in no way improperly limited since
the very nature of the thing in question makes its joint utilization indis-
pensable."
It would appear that all of the various doctrines regarding compulsory
community property (forced co-ownership) require that the thing which
is to be the object of the community must be accessory to an ordinary
ownership.0 The traditional doctrine, however, has been extended to include
1. Neuno coinpellitur invito in conmunione detincri.
2. See 3 WINDSCHEID, DIRITTO DELLE PANi)E'rT'I'E 34 (1925), also 3 MAYANZ, Couns
DE DROiT ROMAiN 500 (1891).
3. DicEsT 10, 3, 19.
4. 11 DA CUNHA GONcALVES, TTADO DE DIREITO CIVIL .... 63 (1957).
5. 2 COLIN-CAPITANT, Cupso ELE14ENTAL D DERECHO CIVIL 625 (1933).
6. CAPiTANT, L'INDIVISION, IN REPERITIONS ECRITES PE DROIT CIVIL APPROFONDI 8
(1927-8).
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things which are not within the purview of mere accessories or auxiliary to
ownership in the classic sense.
Does compulsory joint ownership exist in Mexican law? An answer must
first be sought in the civil code. Article 939 states that "the law does not
impose the duty on owners of property by whatever title they may have
taken, to keep that ownership undivided except where, either because of the
nature of the things in question or by rule of law, ownership is indivisible."
To put it another way, the joint owners may only be compelled to maintain
the joint ownership when either by the nature of the thing or by legal
disposition it is incapable of being partitioned. The more limited form of
joint ownership, in accordance vith the classic theory, is expressly adopted
by the Mexican legal system.
The following article of the Code, Article 940, appears to destroy the
effect of the one just mentioned. It states that "if the ownership of a thing is
not divisible or the thing does not admit of an easy division and the joint
owners have not been able to agree on its transfer to one of them, the
court shall decree its sale and the distribution of the price among those
holding an interest in the property." A literal interpretation of this article
would not appear to be justified; a too superficial analysis could carry with
it serious consequences. We agree with Barassi8 that the term "ownership
incapable of division" has many meanings. The first and purest meaning is
that there are things which arc absolutely indivisible; that is, in which the
community of ownership cannot be dissolved in any fashion, not even by
forced sale at auction with a division of the price or by adjudging the thing
to the ownership of one of those holding a joint interest. Such a situation
is found, for example, in the Horizontal Property Law,' the law governing
the property system regarding buildings divided by floors, apartments, or
other living units."
Secondly, "ownership incapable of divison" could mean that a thing
is indivisible if it is not capable of being divided in the physical sense, but
it can be divided in law either through forced sale and division of proceeds
or by turning it over to one of the several joint owners in its entirety in
exchange for that joint owner's surrendering an interest of an equal value
in another piece of jointly owned property. Here it is obvious that one is
dealing with a mere physical indivisibility and not with a community inter-
est incapable of division, e.g., the case of a painting or an automobile
belonging jointly to several individuals.
7. LABRET, LA NOTION DE L'INDIVII&ON DANS LE DRorr FRANCAIS ACTUEL (1922)
cited from 4 BoNEcAssE, SUPPLEMENT AU TRAITE THEORIQUE NT PRATIQUE DE DRorr
CIVIL 357. The most liberal opinions in this regard are expressed in Italy by BARAssi,
PROPI ETA E COMPROPRIETA 762 (1951), and BRANCA.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. Ley sobre el regimen de propriedad y condominio de los edificios divididos pot
pisos, departamentos, viviendas o locales (1954), Diario Official t.107, no. 38 of Decem-
ber 15, 1954. The act appears to be the equivalent of what is now called the Law of
Horizontal Property in many of the Latin American countries.
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There is a third meaning in which the indivisibility is reduced to the
lowest degree. This occurs when the circumstances make it merely eco-
nomically inconvenient or inopportune to divide the thing. An example of
this situation is a collection of movables or personal property which could
be divided among those holding the joint interests, but where the totality
has a far greater economic value than the sum of the component parts.
It is felt very strongly that Article 940 is only applicable in the latter
two instances mentioned. To apply it in the first would be to assume that
the code intended to create a grave inequity. Planiol put it very well: "laws
are enacted to produce for men the greatest possible usefulness. A legal
system which gives unjust or unsatisfactory results is a poor one, violating
its own central purpose. No legal system can be understood by pure logic
alone; logic must be tempered by considerations of equity and utility. It
is obvious that there is a limit which must be maintained, beyond which
the judge, who is a mere interpreter of the law, cannot substitute his per-
sonal belief for the authority of the law, but there is also another evil to
be avoided which is the mere mechanical interpretation of the law that
turns it against itself and brings it to an anti-social end."' 0 The interpre-
tation which is favored here is supported by even the stricter schools of
thought on the proper construction of the law since it is generally agreed
that the law cannot be applied to situations which, even though literally
within the text of the law, are excluded by the spirit of the particular legal
disposition. Even the so-called restrictive interpretive school accepts the
maxim "where reason ceases, there also ceases the law.""
From all the foregoing, it is clear that Mexican law recognizes com-
pulsory community property in general. Planiol, explaining the basis of this
particular form of property holding, stated that "there are relatively few
hypotheses on which to establish the theoretical basis but innumerable cases
in which its practical basis can be found. Tliese practical cases can be divided
into three groups. The first two are made up of outside walls, floors, and
other partitions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the land and
various parts of apartment houses owned by several people. The third group
deals with those things which, either by virtue of their nature or some agree-
ment, have achieved the status of indispensable accessories to two or more
separate pieces of property all having an interest in the common use. In
this third group may be cited such things as covered archways, private streets,
passageways or alley ways, patios, wells, and washrooms, septic tanks serving
various houses, walls, streets, or pathways connected with the use of various
10. 1 PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 224, cited by I BoRJA SOnI-
ANNO, TEORIA GENERAL DR LAS OBLICACIONES 39 (1953).
11. 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE AND HouQuEs FOURCADE, TRAITE TIIEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 263; also I AUBRY AND RAU, COURS nv DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
CAIS 130, both cited by BORJA SoAxRo, op. cit. note 10.
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deposits and dikes, canals, or aqueducts serving several industrial establish-
ments. It lies in the discretion of the judges to determine whether a thing
is really necessary for joint or common usage and whether its partition would
have such a disastrous effect on the uscfulness of the property so served as
to make a division practically impossible.' 1
The first of the cases mentioned by Planiol, concerning joint and party
walls, was also the first to be especially regulated in our civil codes. As early
as 1870 and 1884 our code, based on the 1851 draft Spanish Civil Code, form-
ulated rules governing party walls. These codes placed the rules dealing with
this particular subject matter in Book II regarding goods, property and their
various modifications, Title 6 of servitudes, Chapter 5 of the legal servitude
for common or party walls. Our Code of 1928 properly places all of the
rules dealing with party walls in the chapter on joint ownership. This arrange-
ment, based on the Spanish Code of 1889, seems to be much better than
the prior ones mentioned. The substantive language, however, remains
almost the same as in the earlier codes with only insignificant changes in
terminology.
The second hypothesis of Planiol, that regarding land and houses di-
vided into apartments, was regulated in the earlier Codes of 1870 and 1884
under the title dealing with servitudes, and, together with the dispositions
referring to party walls, passed into the chapter on joint ownership of the
Code of 1928." a The only group mentioned by Planiol which does not have
a particular set of rules in Mexican law is the third, that dealing with
individual properties connected by certain aspects of joint utility, such as
a patio, swimming pool, source of fresh water or a street. The first probleim
here is to find out whether it is true joint ownership or a question of
reciprocal servitudes. Goubcau states that the words "compulsory joint inter-
csts" were originally deemed to be incompatible with the proposition con-
tained in Article 815,14 Instead of holding the perpetual community to be
a form of joint ownership, it was deemed to he one of mutual or reciprocal
servitudes.15
However, from 1858 on the decisions of the French courts began to
admit, at first by implication and later expressely, that these cases were not
really matters of servitudes but were cases of co-ownership. Thus the decision
of the 15th of February, 1858, said, "It is impossible to visualize, in the case
of land destined to remain permanently undivided, either a dominant or
12. 3 PLANIOL AND RIP-RT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE I)Rorr CIVIL IIRANCIAS 281
(1926) In the same sense COLIN AND CAPITANT, Op. Cit. note 5, at 624, and DA CUNIIA
COCALVES, o p. cit. note 4 at 279.
13. Some of the problems involved bave been given consideration in the law cited
in note 9 sutra.
14. "Nobody is compelled to remain in a community; partition may be demanded
in all cases, regardless of an agreement to the contrary."
15. COLIN AND CAPITANT, OP. Cit. note 5, at 626; also 6 BAUDRY-LACANTINIERE AND
CHAUVEAU, TRAITE TIIEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 199 (1905).
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servient tcncemnt. It is rather a question of the continuing exercise of the
rights resulting from co-ownership." Since that time, Goubeau continues,
no doubt has existed about the real distinction between servitudes and com-
pulsory co-ownership. Unfortunately, in reaching this conclusion, our courts
failed to dctcrmine the precise legal character of the limitation contained
in Article 815. They announced that it was an established principle that
certain situations required perpetual joint ownership because "of the nature
and force of circumstances." Today it is sufficient for the courts to make
such a declaration of necessity or greater utility or even to impose the prop-
crty regime automatically without any particular reason.
The same condition may be found in the writings, for example, of
Baudrv-Lacantinierc and Chauveau, that "things are affected by a so-called
servitude of indivisibility,' but this expression is not precise. Compulsory
indivisibility, to tell the truth, is not an incumbrance of things held jointly
or in common. Rather these things are the object of a form of joint owner-
ship, the only restriction on the concept of ownership being that partition
is impossible for the reason it would destroy completely the usefulness of
the particular property . . . The joint owners hold property and not merely
a servitude." In his turn, Plainol stated, "We are not dealing here with a
matter of dominant or servient tenement. The joint owners have equal rights
which are exercised on an absolute par in all the parts of the things jointly
owned." 1!
What practical importance does this doctrinal concept have? Several
practical cases will demonstrate the importance of the answer to this question:
A) Let us suppose a building adjoining on a common alleyway. The
owner of the building wishes to open up several direct entrances onto this
street from the building. According to the first system, this would only be
possible if the way which borders on the alleyway is no less than one
mcter distance from the middle line of the wall (Article 815 Civil Code)
because that line represents the boundary of the adjoining property. Ac-
cording to the second system, it is sufficient if the distance of oie meter
exists between the wall in which the entrances are going to be broken and
the other side of the alleyway since that is where the neighboring property
starts.
B) Now let us suppose the same common passageway is not utilized
by one of the neighboring properties for more than three years. If we were
dealing with a mutual servitude of passage, this would have been wiped out
since this class of servitudes is extinguished by nonuser for three years.'
7
On the contrary, if there is joint property, this situation in the eyes of the
16. CIVIL CODE Art. 1128.
17. I accord AUBRY AND RAU, COIN AND CAP[TANr, JOSSRAND, CUNIIA CONCALVES,
DIAs FERREIRA, BARASST, SCIALOJA AND BRANCA.
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court will not have changed at all as the property right is perpetual whether
it is used or not.'8
Once it has been determined that wc are dealing with a true joint
ownership situation a second problem presents itself. Since there is no
express legislation on the point, what rules shall decide? Should a choice be
made among the two following possible solutions? The first would be to
control these cases by the express rules set out for the two other cases; the
second would be to admit this is a different form of joint ownership regulated
only by the general rules of the civil code.
It appears impossible to apply the rules for party walls to this other
kind of imposed joint ownership. Those rules would be inadequate as they
were conceived with an entirely different legal institution in mind. Certain
of the general norms (e.g., those contained in Articles 959, 960, 971) would
be used by analogy since these norms are applicable to all the forms of
joint ownership.
Another provocative question is whether the Horizontal Property Law
could govern this kind of joint ownership. This question may be examined
from two different points of view. First within the terms of the existing law
and second fron the viewpoint of possible future legislation. It is highly
improbable that this form of community property was within the scope of
legislation concerning horizontal property. Article 951 of the Civil Code as
amended was intended to control only those cases where "the floors, apart-
ments, living quarters, within a building belong to different owners." If this
limitation is not clear enough by itself, the statement of purpose which
the President of the Republic submitted with the horizontal property bill
clarifies the issue. 9 It is obvious from this preamble that the purpose of
the law was only designed to make possible separate ownership of apart-
ments within one building. The law had no intention of dealing with the
situation where separate houses depend upon some common services.?'1 The
most elementary case of horizontal property is pointed out by Poirier as "a
18. "Whereas . . . the Capital of the Republic has undergone an extraordinary de-
velopment in the last forty years resulting in a considerable increase in its demographic
density, which at the same time has caused such an extension in territory as to require
enormous investments in public services for the new subdivisions; and whereas for
various reasons the value of the land and the cost of these public works for new sub-
divisions has risen to such a point that it has made it impossible for persons of limited
means to acquire land on which to build homes, leaving them thus in a situation where
they must rent living quarters; for all these reasons and in view of the experience of
other countries in solving this problem by cooperative housing based on horizontal
property by floors and apartments; and whereas it appears that this property system can
be applied with satisfactory results in the City of Mexico, and for the purpose of solving
all the problems attendant upon such form of property that have not been properly
solved in our present Civil Code, now therefore .... "
19. See particularly rules contained in Art. 14, 25, 26, 47 and 48 of the law cited
in note 9 supra.
20. POTIRR, LE PROPRIETAIRE D'APPARTEMENF'r 57 (1936); also Nrcai, RECI?%IEN
ARCENTINO DE 1A PROPRIEDAD HORIZONTAL 42 (1955).
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building with two apartments located under one roof; each one has its own
doorway providing completely separated living quarters, one on the ground
floor and the other the first floor .... This is not a situation where two twin
semi-detached houses are separated by a party wall but rather have a suitable
form of construction which eliminate, as far as possible, parts that are
commonly used. In the true horizontal property there are not even common
hallways but only economies in the use of land and construction ma-
terials." 2 '
Let us now look at the problem from the second point of view, that
of legal policies. Were these situations to be declared under the control
of the Law of Horizontal Property, all of the cases of individual ownership
of services common to the totality, such as patios, wells of water, streets,
pools, etc., would be dealt with in an incorrect way. 'his important legal
institution would suffer as a result of an improper confusion of two distinct
varieties of compulsory indivisibility. It is clear that many of the rules neces-
sary when placed in the Horizontal Property Law, lose their sense if applied
to the classic type of joint ownership. An example would be the prohibition
of excavation, increasing the height of the building, or painting floors dif-
ferent colors. 2 Imagine a building with each floor painted or decorated
differently from the rest. Such a problem does not occur if each apartment
is a separate one-family dwelling. There is no reason to make such uniform
requirements, just as there arc no requirements that all the houses on one
block be of homogeneous design. Without doubt, various articles of the
Law of Horizontal Property could be applied by analogy to these situations,
but the same is true of certain rules for party-walls. In fact, certain general
rules in the field of compulsory joint-ownership are applicable in all of its
various forms.
The reasons cited, in our opinion, definitely establish the distinc-
tion. There is, notwithstanding, a trend of opinion which insists on ap-
plication of the Hlorizonal Property Law to similar cases. No valid tech-
nical ground is ever cited. The points of similarity are taken into con-
sideration, but the unquestionable differences which exist are not accounted
for.
In Mexico City the principal motivation for this reasoning is the
desire to evade certain dispositions of the law of subdivisions, which, for
example, prohibit lots of less than 120 square meters with a frontage of
less than seven meters. Furthermore, when dealing with homes costing
not more than sixty thousands pesos (roughly $4,800) the Horizonal Prop-
erty Law grants certain tax exemptions 3  A similar law of the state of
21. Art. 25, 26 of the law cited in note 9 supra.
22. These are provided for in the Law of exemption from taxes for popular housing
in the District and Federal Territories (decree of December 8, 1956).
23. Ley sobre el r6gimen de propriedad y condomino de los edificios dividos en
pises, departamentos, viviendas o locales dcl Estado de Morelos, Art. 1, and 2 (December
24, 1956, PERIODICO OFICIAL OF DECEMBER 25, 1956).
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Morclos of Dec. 24, 1956, with little reason, declares that "For the pur-
pose of this law, building is understood to be any type of construction or
series of constructions on the same lot, built for dwelling, commercial,
industrial, professional, or any other purpose normal to human activity.
2' ' 4
Perhaps the reason for this definition was the extension to any type of
construction of the privileges enjoyed by the Law of Horizontal Property.25
It appears laudable to us that these constructions be conceded the same
exemptions, but in doing this there is no reason to torture juridical tech-
nique as was done in Morelos. The legislature could have as easily ex-
tended the privileges given horizontal property to housing projects where
the occupants share some facilities in common (classic joint ownership).
The solution suggested here is the one accepted in France. There the
law of February 7, 1953, extended the dispositions of the law of July 28,
1938, to "corporations formed or to be formed, whatever be their corpo-
rate structure, with the object of constructing, acquiring or administering
joint properties for the principal purpose of living quarters composed of
collective properties, individual homes, and, eventually, of common facili-
ties destined to be attributed to the corporate members in property or in
use."
2 1
We have affirmed that joint ownership of patios, streets, ditches, wells,
and sewers should not be assimilated to the joint ownership of a party
wall, nor to that in buildings separated into individually owned apartments.
This joint ownership, very clearly, has its own rules. In the first place
there is no possibility to seek a partition. Neighbors being what they are,
action for partition would probably be an abuse of rights, having no other
motive than to interfere with the other joint owners. Even were this not
true, partition has no place in this kind of property. To the legal argu-
ments already mentioned, we may add the following: Article 951 of the
Civil Code and Article 15 of its supplementary regulations declare that the
joint ownership of elements common to an entire building is not capable
of partition. The very same reason that lies behind this prohibition of
partition of houses applies to the joint ownership of patios, streets, wells
and the other common services. This is merely an application of the ge-
eral rule of Article 939 of the Civil Code that partition cannot be sought
when the ownership is indivisible. The analogy is quite clear.
In the second place, in accordance with Article 941 of the Civil Code,
a contractural agreement can be made by the joint owners to facilitate
the administration of common facilities. In the absence of such settle-
24. Art. 2 (transitional) of the law cited in note 23 supra.
25. Art. 80 of the law of February 7, 1953 (JOURNAL OFFICIEL, February 8, 1953),
tit. III. See DENIs, SociTS DE CONSTRUCTION ET COPROPRIETE DES IMMIlEUBLES DivwEs
PAR APPARTEMENTS 240 (1954), and BOTARD, Legislation Francais en Alati&c de Droit
Civil, 51 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE D.OIT CIVIL 401 (1953).
26. COLIN AND CAPITANT, op. cit. note 5, at 624.
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ment, Articles 942 to 944 control. With respect to Article 950, we agree
with the general opinion that the joint owner cannot "dispose of his
rights in the thing jointly held to any person outside of the community"
for the same reasons that a partition cannot be sought. Furthermore,
"granted the perpetual character of the indivisibility, each owner will enjoy
powers more extensive than that of the ordinary joint owner. He can freely
enjoy the thing for the purposes established by agreement or by its nature.
Likewise, he can transform or modify the thing within the same terms.
The owner of a common patio can raise the ground level of the garden,
or construct small drainage canals. . . .The co-proprietor of an alleyway
can add a fence provided it does not impede passage. . . . It can be
generally stated that each owner can conduct himself as though he were
the exclusive owner of the facility in question, subject to two basic limi-
tations: (1) he can not modify its character; thus the co-proprietor of a
patio cannot install a warehouse or stable, nor carry on his business there
if the patio were designed as a passageway . . .; and (2) he must use the
thing for the purposes for which it was placed in imposed and indivisible
joint ownership. ' 27
27. COLIMN AND CAPTTANT, Op. Cit. note 5, at 286.
